Religion And The Theory Of Descent

In seeking to define our position in regard to the theory of descent it is

most important that we should recognise that, when it is looked into

closely, the true problem at issue is not a special zoological one, but is

quite general, and also that it is not a new growth which has sprung up

suddenly and found us unprepared, but that it is very ancient and has long

existed in our midst. In the whole theory the question of "descent" i

after all a mere accessory. Even if it fell through and were seen to be

scientifically undemonstrable, "evolution in the realm of life" would

remain an indisputable fact, and with it there would arise precisely the

same difficulties for the religious interpretation of the world which are

usually attributed to the Theory of Descent.



Evolution or development has been a prominent idea in the history of

thought since the time of Aristotle, but descent is, so to speak, a modern

upstart. According to long-established modes of thought, to evolve means

to pass from {~GREEK SMALL LETTER DELTA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER UPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER MU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~} to {~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER RHO~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER GAMMA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~} {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER IOTA~}, from potentia to actus, from

the existence of the rudiment as in the seed to full realisation as in the

tree. In the course of its development the organism passes through many

successive phases, which are related to one another like steps, each

rising directly from the one beneath, and preparing for the one above.

Thus all nature, and especially the realm of life, implies a ladder of

"evolution." What is "potentially" inherent in the lowest form of life has

in the highest, as in man, become actual or "realised" through a

continuous sequence of phases, successively more and more evolved. This

view in its earlier forms was very far from implying that each higher step

was literally "descended" from the one below it, through the physical and

mental transformation of some of its representatives. As the world, in

Aristotle's view for instance, had existed from all eternity, so also had

the stages and forms of life, each giving rise again to its like. Indeed,

the essential idea was that each higher step is simply a development, a

fuller unfolding of the lower stage, and finally that man was the complete

realisation of what was potentially inherent in the lowest of all.



This doctrine of evolution was in modern times the fundamental idea of

Leibnitz and Kant, of Goethe, Schelling and Hegel. It brought unity and

connectedness into the system of nature, united everything by steps,

denied the existence of gaping chasms, and proclaimed the solidarity of

all the forms of life. But to all this the idea of actual descent was

unnecessary. An actual material variation and transition from one stage to

another seemed to it a wooden and gross expression of the evolution idea,

an "all too childish and nebulous hypothesis" (Hegel).



All the important results of comparative morphology and physiology, which

the modern supporters of the doctrine of descent so confidently utilise as

arguments in its favour, would have been welcomed by those who held the

original and general evolution idea, as a corroboration of their own

standpoint. And as a matter of fact they all afford conclusive proofs of

evolution; but not one of them, including even the fundamental

biogenetic law and the inoculated chimpanzee, is decisive in regard to

descent. This contention is sufficiently important to claim our

attention for a little. Let us take the last example. Transfusion of blood

between two species is possible, not necessarily because they are

descended from one another or from a common root, but solely because of

their systematic (ideal) relationship, that is to say because they are

sufficiently near to one another and like one another in their

physiological qualities and functions. If, assuming descent, this homology

were disturbed, and the systematic relationship done away with, for

instance through saltatory evolution, the mere fact of descent would not

bring the two species any nearer one another. Thus the case proves only

systematic relationship, and only evolution. But as to the meaning of this

systematic relationship, whether it can be "explained" by descent, whether

it has existed from all eternity, or how it has arisen, the experiment

does not inform us.



The same idea may be illustrated in regard to Weismann's "predicting."

This, too, is a proof of evolution, but not of descent. Exactly as

Weismann predicted the striping of the hawk-moth caterpillars and the

human os centrale, Goethe predicted the formation of the skull from

modified vertebrae, and the premaxillary bone in man. In precisely the same

way he "derived" the cavities in the human skull from those of the animal

skull. This was quite in keeping with the manner and style of his Goddess

Nature and her creative transformations, raising the type of her creations

from stage to stage, developing and expanding each new type from an

earlier one, yet keeping the later analogous to and recapitulative of the

earlier, recording the earlier by means of vestigial and gradually

dwindling parts.



But what has all this to do with descent? Even the "biogenetic law"

itself, especially if it were correct, would fit admirably into the frame

of the pure evolution idea. For it is quite consistent with that idea to

say that the higher type in the course of its development, especially in

its embryonic stages, passes through stages representative of the forms of

life which are below it and precede it in the (ideal) genealogical tree.

Indeed, the older doctrine of evolution took account of this long ago.



"The same step-ladder which is exhibited by the whole animal kingdom, the

steps of which are the different races and classes, with at the one

extreme the lowliest animals and at the other the highest, is exhibited

also by every higher animal in its development, since from the moment of

its origin until it has reached its full development it passes

through--both as regards internal and external organisation--the essentials

of all the forms which become permanent for a lifetime in the animals

lower than itself. The more perfect the animal is, the longer is the

series of forms it passes through."



So J. Fr. Meckel wrote in 1812 in his "Handbook of Pathological Anatomy,"

with no thought of descent. And the facts which led to the construction

of the biogenetic law were discovered in no small measure by Agassiz, who

was an opponent of the doctrine of descent.(31)



But the advance from the doctrine of evolution to that of descent was

imperatively prompted by a recognition of the fact that the earth is not

from everlasting, and that the forms of life upon it are likewise not from

everlasting, that, in fact, their several grades appear in an orderly

ascending series. It is therefore simpler and more plausible to suppose

that each higher step has arisen from the one before it, than to suppose

that each has, so to speak, begun an evolution on its own account. A

series of corroborative arguments might be adduced, and there is no doubt,

as we have said before, that the transition from the general idea of

evolution to that of descent will be fully accomplished. But it is plain

that the special idea of descent contributes nothing essentially new on

the subject.



It is an oft-repeated and self-evident statement, that it is in reality a

matter of entire indifference whether man arose from the dust of the earth

or from living matter already formed, or, let us say, from one of the

higher vertebrates. The question still would be, how much or how little of

any of them does he still retain, and how far does he differ from all?

Even if there be really descent, the difference may quite as well be so

great--for instance, through saltatory development--that man, in spite of

physical relationship, might belong to quite a new category far

transcending all his ancestors in his intellectual characteristics, in his

emotional and moral qualities. There is nothing against the assumption,

and there is much to be said in its favour, that the last step from animal

to man was such an immense one that it brought with it a freedom and

richness of psychical life incomparable with anything that had gone

before--as if life here realised itself for the first time in very truth,

and made everything that previously had been a mere preliminary play.



On the other hand, even were there no descent but separate individual

creation, man might, in virtue of his ideal relationship and evolution,

appear nothing more than a stage relatively separate from those beneath

him in evolution. It was not the doctrine of descent, it was the doctrine

of evolution that first ranked man in a series with the rest of creation,

and regarded him as the development of what is beneath him and leads up to

him through a gradual sequence of stages. And his nearness, analogy, or

relationship to what is beneath him is in no way increased by descent, or

rendered a whit more intimate or more disturbing.